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Striking a Balance: Basic Questions About
Consumer Protection Law
Kurt Eggert∗
Chapman Law Reviewís annual symposium, this year
entitled ìResponsibility and Reform: Striking a Balance in the
Marketplace,î is focused on an important issue in todayís legal
landscape: how much and what kinds of protections should be
provided to consumers? Central to this issue is how to balance
the protection of consumersí persons and pocketbooks with the
defense of their autonomy, how to keep consumers from entering
into dangerous or disadvantageous transactions without
stripping them of the freedom to choose for themselves which
products, services, and deals will most benefit them. The panels
of speakers for the symposium were focused on four separate but
interrelated topics: Predatory Lending, Punitive Damages, Gun
and Tobacco Liability, and Californiaís Unfair Trade Practices
Act (Business and Professions Code Section 17200).
This Introduction sets forth some of the most important
questions raised in the course of the Symposium and describes
some answers suggested in the articles that follow. Naturally,
the authors often disagree with each other, but my goal is not to
prove that one side or the other in any debate is correct but
merely to lay out the questions in a methodical manner and
direct the reader to the different authorsí attempts to respond to
these questions.
1.

Which Transactions Benefit Consumers?

Normally, consumers are better judges of which transactions
benefit them than any state regulator or legislator could be, as
consumers have more direct and in depth knowledge of their own
preferences. Professor Narveson, in ìConsumerís Rights in the
Laissez-Faire Economy: How Much Caveat for the Emptor?,î
states, ìDid Consumer make a ëgood buy?í Thatís for Consumer
However, this basic principle has important
to decide.î1
∗

Associate Professor of Law, Chapman University School of Law.
1 Jan Narveson, Consumersí Rights in the Laissez-Faire Economy: How Much
Caveat for the Emptor?, 7 CHAP. L. REV. 181, 193 (2004).
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limitations, since to be effective judges of whether a transaction
will provide a net benefit to them, consumers must be informed
and competent to make the decision at hand, and the transaction
must be voluntary.
Most of the disagreement over whether and how much
protection to provide consumers stems from conflicting opinions
about when consumersí decisions are sufficiently informed,
competent, and voluntary. Too little protection leaves consumers
vulnerable to abuse. Too much protection leads to a paternalistic
restriction of consumersí autonomy. Where exactly to draw the
line between protection and paternalism is subject to great
dispute. Proponents and opponents of consumer protection
disagree on how much information consumers need to make
decisions effectively, who is responsible for ensuring they have
that information, what decisions consumers are competent to
make without help, how often they lack the ability to make good
decisions, and how voluntary their agreements are to the terms
of various transactions. How these disputes are resolved is
central to the design, role, and function of consumer protection
law.
2.

Should there be a Separate Law of Consumer Protection?

A basic question addressed in this symposium is whether
there should be a separate law of consumer protection to begin
with, or whether the common law systems of contracts and torts
provide consumers with all the protection they need or deserve,
or that it is efficient to provide them. In his article ìConsumer
Law, Class Actions, and the Common Law,î Greve lays out (only
to attempt to knock down) the normally stated rationales for
consumer protection: that buyers have limited information
gathering and processing abilities or even limited rationality in
their decision-making process which leads them to make errors
in their transactions. This information asymmetry and unequal
bargaining power between seller and consumer allows merchants
to take advantage of the ignorance and lack of bargaining
prowess of the less sophisticated buyers.2
Greve argues, however, that each of these arguments proves
either too much or too little, since information asymmetries and
unequal bargaining powers exist in commercial as well as
consumer transactions. Greve is even more concerned about the
overlay of a consumer protection system on top of the common
law; worried that a duplicative set of systems will decrease,
2 Michael S. Greve, Consumer Law, Class Actions, and the Common Law, 7 CHAP. L.
REV. 155, 157 (2004).
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rather than increase, the benefits of those laws to consumers.
Professor Harrell, in his article ìBasic Choices in the Law of Auto
Finance: Contract Versus Regulation,î also argues for the
primacy of the common law over separate consumer protection
law. He states that because contract and tort law depend on
case-by-case decision-making by judges, rather than on acrossthe-board rule-making by a regulatory body, the common law
system infringes less on the freedom to contract as it wields a
more precise scalpel to cut out inappropriate transactions.3
Harrell also asserts that this system of individual trials is better
able to address the infinite variety of fraud, duress, and abuse
than a ìone size fits allî regulatory scheme. Unlike the common
law, which Harrell sees as being based on the usage of market
participants, consumer protection law is largely designed by
legislators and regulators.
Thus, Harrell views consumer
protection law as the ìtop-downî imposition of their own interests
and views by an elite few and fundamentally different from the
common law, which bubbles up from everyone who participates
in commerce.
In contrast, Michael L. Rustad, in his article ìPunitive
Damages in Cyberspace: Where in the World is the Consumer?,î
portrays a bleak fate for consumers who cannot depend on
effective consumer protection law in the unregulated,
unprotected environment of Internet commerce. In the wild west
of cyberspace, consumers face scammers posing as legitimate
businesses, ìphishingî for credit card numbers and other credit
information.4 Rustad argues that ordinary damages in tort or
contract actions would not provide consumers adequate
protection, as the on-line evildoers are too unlikely to be caught.
Even when they are caught, rarely can a judgment be collected
from ìphishersî and Internet scammers.
3.

Should Consumer Protection Generally be Enforced by
Governmental Agencies, Private Litigation, or Both?

If consumer protection law is to exist, we must still decide
whether the dominant means to enforce that law should be
governmental regulatory enforcement, either through agency
litigation or otherwise, or private litigation. In his article
focusing on the firearms industry, ìSuing the Firearms Industry:
A Case for Federal Reform?,î Stephen P. Halbrook argues that
3 Alvin C. Harrell, Basic Choices in the Law of Auto Finance: Contract Versus
Regulation, 7 CHAP. L. REV. 107, 110-11 (2004).
4 Michael L. Rustad, Punitive Damages in Cyperspace: Where in the World is the
Consumer?, 7 CHAP. L. REV. 39, 40 (2004). ìPhishingî is the act of posing as a legitimate
business in order to obtain confidential information from another. Id. at 40-41.
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where legislation has already struck a definite balance and a
pervasive set of regulations govern a specific sector of consumer
affairs, private litigation that is not authorized by that
legislation and regulatory structure is inappropriate, even if it is
based on traditional common law causes of action such as public
nuisance or other torts.5 Greve appears to agree, stating that an
obvious means of preventing the underdeterrence of wrongdoing
is to ìentrust public agencies with the definition and enforcement
of prohibitions and injunctions against unfair or fraudulent
business practices,î without forcing those agencies to prove the
common law elements of any cause of action.6 Greve laments
that only rarely do federal and state regulations, as enforced by
the appropriate agencies, have preclusive effect and preempt
private litigation. He says that ì[c]ompliance defenses rarely
succeed in liability lawsuits over ëunsafeí pharmaceutical drugs
or automobiles. The risk is not simply confusion or incoherence:
it is massive over-deterrence.î7
By comparison, and as previously noted, Harrell prefers the
individualized decision process of common law trials to the
system-wide rulemaking of regulation. Harrell also notes that
ìpublic enforcement has exceeded the volume of private
litigationî in many areas of federal law.8 Moreover, Harrell notes
that a significant portion of consumer regulation is federal in
nature, and that federal regulation, as opposed to state litigation,
benefits large, national enterprises over smaller, local businesses
that are less able to bear the burden of complex federal
regulation.9 Rustad observes that regulatory agencies attempt to
track down and punish bad actors in cyberspace, but that these
agencies are overwhelmed. ìIt is as if the FTC is trying to hold
back a tidal wave of cyberfraud with a broom.î10
4.

Should Consumer Protection Law Primarily Be Enacted at
the State or Federal Level?

A question closely related to the choice between regulatory
action and private litigation is whether most consumer protection
law should be enacted at the state or federal level. Harrell notes
that regulatory action is more often federal, while most private
litigation occurs in state courts. He argues this rough division is
5 Stephen P. Halbrook, Suing the Firearms Industry: A Case for Federal Reform?, 7
CHAP. L. REV. 11, 21-22 (2004).
6 Greve, supra note 2, at 159-60.
7 Id. at 171 (internal citation omitted).
8 Harrell, supra note 3 at, 121.
9 Id. at 121-22.
10 Rustad, supra note 4, at 80.
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caused by the fact that most common law is state law and even
statutory contract law is primarily state law, whereas most
regulatory law, with significant exceptions, is federal law.11
Harrell asserts that state-based common law is more flexible and
better able to nourish the development of new and innovative
industries, while broad-based federal regulation leads more often
to the dominance of large, stable firms.12
In his article ìWrong from the Start? North Carolinaís
ëPredatory Lendingí Law and the Practice v. Product Debate,î
Donald C. Lampe worries that, rather than nurturing new and
innovative financial service companies, the state-based laws
attempting to prevent predatory lending have created a
ìregulatory Tower of Babel for multi-state residential mortgage
lenders.î13 Inconsistent state laws, in Lampeís view, fall too
heavily on large, multi-state businesses. Halbrook is also
concerned that state regulation will lead to an unreasonable
burden on interstate commerce, in this case, the interstate sale of
firearms.14
Playing an important role in deciding whether federal or
state law will govern consumer issues is the doctrine of
preemption, which allows federal laws and regulations to
supercede their state counterparts. However, states have their
own arsenal of weapons to combat the wholesale preemption of
their systems of consumer protection. Lampe notes that states
attempt to subvert, stealthily if need be, federal preemption. For
example, North Carolinaís predatory lending law focused on
consumer protection rather than on interest rate limitations as a
way to avoid the preemptive effect of the Alternative Mortgage
Transaction Parity Act (ìAMTPAî), which frees protected lenders
from statesí usury ceilings.15 Lampe argues that, to the extent
that state law discourages lenders protected by AMTPA from
making high cost home loans, the state law can be seen as a
ìstealth overrideî of the federal preemption.16
By comparison, Harrell celebrates the surprising dominance
of private state law litigation in the consumer protection arena
and the fact that federal regulation has not occupied the field.
This, Harrell states, ìis surely a testament to the viability of the
common law system and should provide a continuing lesson for
Harrell, supra note 3, at 121-22.
Id. at 122.
Donald C. Lampe, Wrong From the Start? North Carolinaís ìPredatory Lendingî
Law and the Practice vs. Product Debate, 7 CHAP. L. REV. 135, 148 (2004).
14 Halbrook, supra note 5, at 32.
15 Lampe, supra note 13, at 142.
16 Id. at 143.
11
12
13
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policy makers and advocates on both sides of the consumer law
policy debates.î17
5.

What Areas Of Commerce Involving Consumers Should
Receive Their Own Sets of Special Rules?

An issue addressed by two of the symposium authors is
whether any areas of commerce should be governed by their own
sets of special rules. Halbrook argues that trade in firearms
should be exempt from some forms of litigation, such as suits for
public nuisance, negligence, ìnegligent design and marketing . . .
, strict liability for defective . . . products, and ultra-hazardous
activity.î18 Halbrook argues that the provisions of the Second
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, as well as similar
provisions in various state constitutions, should foreclose such
private litigation.
By comparison, Rustad argues that the unique
characteristics of Internet commerce require special protections
for consumers, since few consumers have the technical
sophistication ìto determine who is tracking their click-streams,
Many
unleashing viruses, or sending fraudulent offers.î19
website providers and other Internet businesses have no assets
or physical, as opposed to virtual, presence in the United
States.20 Even tortfeasors inside the United States may be
difficult to locate, as they can falsify the return addresses on
their emails and so post defamatory or deceptive messages
anonymously.21 Rustad argues that these aspects of Internet
commerce render ordinary damages an insufficient deterrent for
wrongdoing.22
6.

Does Consumer Protection Necessarily or Unduly Limit
Consumersí Autonomy?

Professor Harrell sees an immutable, inevitable trade-off
between the autonomy of consumers and their protection,
concluding that the two alternatives are (a) party autonomy
protected and achieved by the consumersí ability to freely to
enter into contracts and (b) restricted autonomy, caused by
regulations that limit the products or services or the terms of
consumer transactions.23 However, I have argued elsewhere that
17
18
19
20
21
22
23

Harrell, supra note 3, at 122.
Halbrook, supra note 5, at 11.
Rustad, supra note 4, at 69.
Id. at 69-70.
Id. at 64.
Id. at 93.
Harrell, supra note 3, at 132.
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mere freedom of choice and lack of regulation does not
necessarily maximize the autonomy of consumers.24 A consumer
unrestricted by consumer protection law may end up with less
autonomy if he enters into transactions under the influence of a
high-pressure sales agent and without the information or time he
needs to decide what he really wants.25 Worse yet, if unprotected
by predatory lending regulation, a homeowner who loses her
house because of a high cost loan could lose the critical personal
autonomy that being a homeowner provides.26 Paradoxically,
specific limitations of autonomy, such as absolute freedom to
contract, may result in the overall maximization of a consumerís
autonomy.27
One specific limitation on consumersí freedom to contract is
caused by merchantsí use of form contracts of adhesion which
consumers have no means of revising or renegotiating. Rustad
notes that such contracts dominate Internet commerce,
appearing not only as ìshrink-wrapî contracts that a buyer
purportedly agrees to by opening a product purchased over the
Internet, but also as ìweb-wrapî contracts that spring into effect
when one uses a web page.28 Rustad argues that these form
agreements force consumers, often unwittingly, not only to waive
their rights to punitive damages and other tort remedies, but
also to agree to choice of law and choice of forum terms that may
severely limit their ability to sue.29
Harrell, on the other hand, asserts that form contracts of
adhesion do not significantly limit consumer autonomy. Instead,
consumers are not prevented from negotiating the significant
terms of their transactions, such as price.30 Furthermore,
Harrell argues that at least in consumer credit transactions,
consumer form contract terms are mandated by law or by the
secondary market, and these standards are designed not only to
be consistent but also fair.31
7.

What Forms of Consumer Protections Should Be Used?

Informational remedies, including the requirement that
merchants disclose some information regarding their products,
are perhaps the easiest form of consumer protection to defend.
24 Kurt Eggert, Lashed To The Mast And Crying For Help: How Self-Limitation Of
Autonomy Can Protect Elders From Predatory Lending, 36 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 693 (2002).
25 Id. at 732.
26 Id.
27 Id. at 736.
28 Rustad, supra note 4, at 88.
29 Id. at 87-90.
30 Harrell, supra note 3, at 111.
31 Id. at 127.
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Even Greve, who refers to consumer law ìin its modern,
disembodied stateî as a ìbastard regime,î32 agrees that
mandatory disclosure requirements can be ìefficient in some
settings.î33 Narveson frames the question not so much as
whether the merchant should be required to divulge information,
but rather how much information is required, how precise that
information must be, and how high a level of risk must be before
that risk must be disclosed.34 What punishment should the
business face if it provides inaccurate information, intentionally
or otherwise? The goal, to Narveson, is to ensure that the seller
does not significantly increase the amount of risk that a
consumer faces involuntarily.35
Restrictions on types or terms of agreements and banning
certain abusive practices are less universally popular. Greve
argues that merchants, when faced with limitations on some
termsósuch as the interest rate they can chargeówill instead
compete ìon some other, less transparent margin.î36 Lampe
criticizes the effort to restrict particular loan terms and products
such as high cost loans, rather than merely attacking abusive
sales practices and tightening the requirements to be a mortgage
broker.37
Consumer protection can be provided not only by giving
consumers causes of action not recognized by the common law,
but also by increasing the penalties that consumers can seek,
including punitive damages for bad behavior by businesses, or by
providing remedies, such as disgorgement of profits in addition to
or instead of traditional damages.38 While Greve asserts that
corporations universally oppose punitive damages,39 Rustad
notes that in Internet litigation, punitive damages are a sword
typically wielded by large corporations against individuals, such
as cybersquatters, spammers, and critics.40 Also, Rustad argues
that enhanced remedies such as punitive damages are necessary
to encourage individual litigants to act as private attorneys
general and so protect other consumers.41
Greve criticizes other tools of consumer protection, such as
class actions and laws lessening the common lawís standing
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41

Greve, supra note 2, at 178.
Id. at 156.
Narveson, supra note 1, at 194-95.
Id. at 199.
Greve, supra note 2, at 161.
See generally Lampe, supra note 13.
Greve, supra note 2, at 160.
Id. at 177.
Rustad, supra note 4, at 57-58.
Id. at 100.
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requirements. Greve asserts that the procedural protections and
due process safeguards of class actions ìare deadweight at best
and an invitation to opportunism at worstî42 and he raises the
ìspecter that corporate defendants will cut themselves cheap,
collusive settlements with a plaintiffsí lawyer of their choice.î43
Unfair competition law that does not involve a certified class
suffers, Greve argues, from the lack of preclusive effect, thus
leaving defendants who win, lose, or settle still subject to suit on
the same or similar claims.44
Lampe, by comparison, criticizes consumer protection
regulations that remove the intent requirement and impose strict
liability, for example on loans that trip certain triggers imposing
additional regulation on high cost loans.45 Such strict liability is
even more dangerous, Lampe asserts, when it is framed in
ìambiguous, non-standard definitionsî and the lender is given
only a limited opportunity to cure any mistakes or missteps.46
Both Lampe and Harrell are troubled by laws seeking to
protect consumers by forcing third parties, such as the assignees
of loans, to be liable for the bad actions of the original seller or
lender who dealt with the consumer. Lampe views such laws as
a ìmarket disruptiveî47 approach not to mention ìesoteric and
legally complicated.î48 Harrell is especially wary of class action
attorneys seeking assignee liability in order to find a deep pocket
or a windfall and warns that the resulting litigation costs as well
as liability risks to assignees can harm consumers by driving up
the cost of doing business.49 I have argued, on the other hand,
that assignee liability is a crucial weapon in the battle against
predatory lending, as it forces secondary markets to police
mortgage brokers.50 By protecting borrowers from abusive loan
practices, assignee liability should lower, rather than increase,
the cost of credit.
Conclusion
Consumer protection law is a complex, vibrant body of
doctrine and can be examined from many different viewpoints.
Chapmanís symposium shows the importance of the questions
Greve, supra note 2, at 166.
Id. at 167-68.
Id. at 168.
Lampe, supra note 13, at 143.
Id.
Id. at 149.
Id. at 151.
Harrell, supra note 3, at 130.
Kurt Eggert, Held Up in Due Course: Predatory Lending, Securitization, and the
Holder in Due Course Doctrine, 35 CREIGHTON L. REV. 503 (2002).
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
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that arise from this area of law, as well as how the individual
authors have chosen to answer them. From the differing and
conflicting views that follow should come a richer understanding
of the balance that must be struck between protection and
paternalism in the design and implementation of consumer
protection laws.

